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Freedom and religion
We will begin with a few comments on the very notion of religious 
freedom, as it is an entirely modern concept. In the teaching of the Cath-
olic Church, it was first recognised as a positive value in the Declaration 
on Religious Freedom Dignitatis Humanae.1 Common perception regards 
it as an essential element of civil freedoms.
However, we need to raise a question whether the concept applies to 
the description of the reality and the rules of social life in ancient Rome. 
For the sake of diligence, the two elements of the phrase have to be con-
sidered separately.
Freedom. Roman culture and, consequently, legislation, cherished the 
notion of freedom; in the legislation, however, it was not expressed as 
an equality of citizens vis-à-vis the state, but on the contrary, as the dif-
ferentiation of their rights and responsibilities depending on the social 
class they belonged to. The very idea of Roman law was based on the 
recognition that the power of the state was not absolute — the Romans, 
at least those who were free, were citizens, not subjects of an absolute 
ruler. Of great significance is a well-known rule of Roman law: Cogita-
1 Dignitatis Humanae, 2.
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tionis poenam naemo patitur — “Nobody should be punished for their 
thoughts.” The rule set the limits for the application of law and kept the 
power of the state on the outside of the citizen — the state had no power 
over one’s inner part, the soul or human thoughts. 
Religion. The statement that Christianity is a religion seems an obvious 
one today, but early Christians, especially before Constantine, were reluc-
tant to apply this term to themselves. Apologists even opposed including 
Christianity to religions and defined it as either the true philosophy (Jus-
tin) or the perfect law (Tertullian); they firmly renounced any association 
with religions contemporary with them. And that is how Christians were 
perceived from the outside: one of the standard accusations appearing in 
anti-Christian texts of the first three centuries was that of atheism. 
In fact, for ancient Rome religion meant first of all cult — external 
and, most of all, public worshipping of a god, gods, or deities. The ques-
tion of doctrine, that is, orthodoxy — a concept that is fundamental for 
Christianity — was practically irrelevant for religions or cults practiced 
within the Roman Empire. Therefore, what we today describe as religious 
syncretism was an obvious phenomenon: mutual permeation of different 
cults, participation in ceremonies devoted to different gods depending on, 
for example, the place of stay — when someone arrived in a town where 
a local god was worshipped, they simply joined in and were never asked 
about the substance of their faith. The situation looked different for mys-
tery religions. However, they do not fall within the scope of our subject. 
Thus, Roman religions consisted of a set of rites and as such, they had 
an important place in public life. Anyone who refused to participate in 
those rites would automatically exclude themselves from public life. 
The Roman authorities basically accepted and appreciated such a state 
of play, but simultaneously one has to notice an evolution which took 
place already in the era of the Empire. From the very beginning, Roman 
emperors defined themselves as divus, divine, yet, over the 1st and the 
2nd centuries, they generally did not interfere in religious cults. Obvi-
ously, they exercised certain care, or rather control over them: starting 
with Augustus, emperors took over the title of pontifex maximus from 
Roman priests. In the 3rd century AD, however, the emperors realised 
what power the religious authority may have, and they began to look at 
the religious unity as an important binding element to provide for the 
unity of the enormous Empire. The construction of the official cult of the 
Empire was launched. It cannot be excluded that the Roman emperors 
followed the example of the eastern empires, mainly Persia, whose influ-
ence was growing and where the state religion (Zoroastrianism of the 3rd 
and the 4th centuries) played an essential role in the legitimisation and 
consolidation of power.
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Such a transformation caused the rise of persecution of the Church 
in the 3rd century. On the one hand, emperors increasingly promoted the 
cult of the state and participation in rites was treated as a test of loyalty to 
the authority, and on the other hand, the Church became more and more 
powerful as an organization and a religious organization which for fun-
damental reasons could not accept participation of Christians in worship 
ceremonies of the state. There is no doubt that leaders of the Church, that 
is, bishops, were becoming more and more aware of the power they had.
Edict of Milan
Following this introduction we will quote an important part of Con-
stantine’s Edict: 
When you see that this has been granted to [Christians] by us, your Wor-
ship will know that we have also conceded to other religions the right of 
open and free observance of their worship for the sake of the peace of our 
times, that each one may have the free opportunity to worship as they 
please; this regulation is made that we may not seem to detract from any 
dignity of any religion.2
The Edict in this fragment clearly refers to the idea of freedom and 
recognises the right of citizens to free choice of religion or worship. In the 
light of what has just been referred to, it sounds revolutionary as well as 
very contemporarily. It seems that Constantine gave up entirely the logic 
that had driven activities of former emperors in the 3rd century and he no 
longer intended to use any religion for promotion of the imperial power. 
The text of the Edict refers to the Roman tradition from the times of the 
Republic, according to which all religions were good for the country and 
they were encompassed by the state’s benevolent care. It was an element 
of Roman law alluded to by Justin and Tertullian in their apologias, in 
which the mentioned authors stated that Christians were good citizens 
just because they were Christians, and therefore, from the point of view 
of the stability of the state, it was beneficial to allow Christians practice 
their faith freely and not to force them to pursue acts that were contrary 
to their conscience.
2 Edict of Milan. In: Lactantius: On the Deaths of the Persecutors (De Mortibus Per- 
secutorum), ch. 48. opera, ed. 0. F. Fritzsche, II, pp. 288 ff. (Bibl Patr. Ecc. Lat. XI).
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However, it soon appeared that both the Emperor and the Church, 
interpreted the text in a different way: not as a departure from the logic of 
a single religion strengthening the power, but as adoption of Christianity 
as the only religion that would support the power instead of the previ-
ously promoted religion of the state.
What indicates such an understanding of the Edict by Constantine? 
We need to remember that he immediately got involved in intra-Christian 
disputes stating that preservation of the unity of the Church is a matter of 
national importance.
However, the fact that such an understanding of the Edict was domi-
nant in the Church from the very beginning is far more interesting for us. 
We can only mention the introduction and the final part of Ecclesiastical 
History by Eusebius. From his point of view the Church was the win-
ner and her history ends with a description of joyful life of the Church 
after years of persecution. Final pages of the history of the Church sound 
almost like a description of the advent of the messianic peace and the 
ultimate victory of Christ. Eusebius called Constantine pontifex maximus 
of Christianity.
More importantly, events which took place over the years 312—313 in 
Africa only confirm the thesis. At this time the Donatist schism flourished 
there. Both parties, that is, Donatus followers and Caecilian supporters, 
asked Constantine to settle the dispute. Thus, Constantine was regarded 
as the entitled adjudicator of intra-Church disputes and he did not refuse 
to intervene.
It is very interesting as Donatists, that is, the supporters of Donatus, 
are commonly regarded as anti-Roman. In the 4th century Donatist move-
ment became increasingly a separatist movement against Roman rule in 
Africa. In 313, however, Donatists decided that it was the emperor that 
had the authority to settle the dispute and believed that as a defender of 
purity of the Church he would take their side. 
The later history fully confirmed that both the Church and subse-
quent emperors had a specific understanding of the Edict. They inter-
preted it as the act which provided Christianity with the status of the 
state religion. The culmination of this process was Theodosius the Great’s 
policy and his edict of 392 which formally raised Christianity to the rank 
of the state religion. Conflicts of Theodosius the Great with Ambrose of 
Milan fall within the scope of this article. They both recognised Christi-
anity as the state religion and believed that it was the duty of the state 
to support it. Taking this approach state authorities increasingly fought 
against all other forms of worship. Theodosius stuck to the traditional 
understanding of pontifex maximus office (he did not call himself Pon-
tifex Maximus of the Church) and in his opinion the emperor was above 
11Augustine’s Argumentation against Religious Freedom
the Church and its internal laws. Ambrose, on the other hand, effectively 
established a new kind of relationship between the Church and the state. 
He viewed the Church as a custodian and guardian of the universal God’s 
commandments and thus the church exerted power over the emperor in 
this respect.
As a result, it became the foundation of relations between the state 
and the Church in Middle Ages that a bishop could anoint a ruler and 
a ruler could not appoint a bishop. 
Augustine’s decisions in Donatist dispute
Augustine learned Christianity from Ambrose. Being a bishop in Africa, 
the latter had been involved in disputes between Catholics and Donatists. 
As it is commonly known, he advocated the Roman military intervention 
against Donatists and supported Catholics. In the light of what has been 
said so far, it is easy to explain Augustine’s attitude. Augustine simply fol-
lowed Ambrose as well as commonly accepted principles of those times. 
Many scholars claim that only Donatist conflict forced sensitive 
Augustine, who after all had had a long history of displaying spiritual 
interest in Manichaeism and had experienced very personal conversion 
in the spirit of freedom and absence of any external coercion, to revise 
his beliefs. Briefly speaking, the view that Augustine’s acceptance or even 
request of military aid from Rome against Donatists was purely practical 
and somewhat against his deepest beliefs about God’s actions and the 
nature of man’s relationship with God, is not uncommon among scholars 
of Augustine’s thought. 
In my opinion his approach was completely different. Augustine was 
convinced that being a bishop and a pastor it was his duty to use any 
means, including direct coercive measures to bring the people entrusted to 
him to the true Church. It was the result of his deepest religious beliefs. 
In other words, Augustine adopted cogite intrare principle due to his pro-
found theological reasons, and not due to external political and social 
circumstances. 
Cogite intrare means “compel them to enter” (see Luke 14:23). Augus-
tine regarded the words of the Parable of the Great Banquet as a motto of 
his approach to the people who did not want to convert voluntarily from 
Donatism to the Catholic Church, but above all he adopted it as a univer-
sal principle of dealing with those who did not demonstrate good will to 
enter the Church.
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Augustine on Grace and Original Sin
I will try to present a theological basis for Augustine’s approach. 
Augustine viewed a man as created by God and as such a man was 
capax Dei. But at the same time a man was burdened with original sin. 
Augustine is a great theologian of original sin. He pointed out that this 
sin affects mainly the free will of man. Its result is lust which practically 
makes human freedom illusive. Thus a man living on earth is above all 
possessed by lust, separated from God, incapable to fulfill commandments 
and reach God. This is possible only by the grace of God. Therefore, it is 
justified to call Augistine Doctor gratiae.
But how does the grace of God work? Obviously, Augustine knows 
that God acts freely and it is impossible to control the grace of God. The 
do ut des principle which, in the context of religion, means offering gifts 
to deity to gain its favour constituted the basis of the entire religion of 
Rome and Augustine viewed it as the essence of paganism and a denial 
of the Christian faith. God is always first. You cannot “earn” anything 
or persuade God to be granted his grace as gratitude for sacrifice. God is 
love and he is always the first in giving. His gifts are for free. Augustine’s 
dispute with Pelagius allowed for a comprehensive and clear presentation 
of the doctrine of the absolute gratuity of grace.
We can indirectly learn possible paths of the grace of God in De civi-
tate Dei according to Augustine. 
In the first twelve books he criticises pagan Rome. It is very interesting 
to see how Augustine, a Roman in his formation and culture, perceives 
various elements of this culture. Augustine makes an overview of the his-
tory of Rome and analyses it critically to show that it was Romans’ sins 
and not conversion to Christianity that led to the fall of Rome.
The basis of this analysis is the following theological perspective: he 
perceived Rome as a community of people living in original sin, a theater 
of demons’ acts that tempted, deceived, and led to perdition. 
However, when you read it more carefully, it appears that, according 
to Augustine, demons act by different forces, depending on a sphere of 
life. They are most powerful with respect to various Roman cults, which 
is not surprising. Augustine also finds it obvious that any magic practices, 
divination or spells, are within demons’ power. It is however interesting 
that Augustine has very critical attitude towards philosophers stating that 
they seek the truth, but, at the same time, are easily deceived by demons. 
For this reason one cannot trust their wisdom. The smallest influence of 
demons Augustine sees in the rights of Rome. In his opinion emperors are 
under influence of demons when they are incited to wage a war in order 
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to gain power and commit atrocities, but the Roman ruler as a guard- 
ian of rights, and law enforcement are perceived by Augustine as good. 
Despite all his criticism of the sins of Rome, Augustine is a Roman who 
appreciates everything that contributed to the power of Rome, that is, 
its legal structure and thus the structure of authority enforcing the law. 
There is no explicit mention of it, but this is the area which Augustine 
perceives as one of the paths of God’s grace rather than the works of phi-
losophers.
As we know, Augustine is convinced that a man after his death will 
be judged by Christ, and if he dies in sin he will be punished with eter-
nal torments in hell. Augustine knew the eastern opinions derived from 
Origen and openly expressed by Gregory of Nyssa on the final universal 
salvation of all people, and firmly rejected and even combat them.
Augustine was aware that it is difficult to reconcile the doctrine of the 
absolute gratuity of grace with the doctrine of judgment and hell which 
assumes man’s personal responsibility for sins, but he did not try to find 
any “golden mean” and stood by both statements. This tension is always 
present in his writings and provides new profound dimension of theo-
logical and philosophical reflection on human freedom. We can say that 
before Augustine freedom as an essential characteristic of the man did 
not constitute an important subject for philosophers. They would rather 
assume that the man is free and capable to make decisions. Only Augus-
tine’s juxtaposition of human freedom and absolute omnipotence of God 
and his primacy, raised this issue to a new level of discussion. It seems 
that it is only modern and contemporary thought that takes Augustine’s 
question regarding existential dimension of human freedom seriously.
Practical implications of Augustine’s theology
Augustine as a shepherd regarded that his main task is to take care 
of salvation of the faithful entrusted to him. As he was convinced of the 
reality of hell, he knew that this was an immense responsibility. Also as 
a bishop he intervened in the Donatist dispute and it should be perceived 
as a form of his pastoral care namely his care for salvation. Any external 
elements such as political systems and relationship between the state and 
the church and everything that seems to explain quite well previously 
described situation is for Augustine of secondary importance. He is prima-
rily a person who should care for salvation of the faithful and as a shep-
herd he does not want to interfere with the grace of God which is in the 
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service of God’s love. Thus he follows God’s love and cares for the faithful 
like a father caring for his children.
Father is primarily concerned with welfare of his children. Eternal sal-
vation is the only ultimate good. Augustine adopts a Roman model of 
a father who is demanding and is not afraid to be hard on his son. This 
is the main manifestation of father’s love. So it is not surprising that strict 
Roman law, including coercive measures applied in order to ensure justice 
and punish injustice constitutes for Augustine a model for understanding 
God’s love as a Father.
Calling troops to compel the Donatists to return to the Catholic 
Church does not constitute a deviation from the principle of love, but 
its execution. Its underlying cause is not the lack of faith in the grace of 
God, but allowing it to take action.
In this light we should read the famous passage from Augustine’s ser-
mons on the First Epistle of St. John. Augustine’s sermons are intended 
to be the anthem praising God’s love. This letter includes St. Augustine’s 
favourite phrase: “God is love” (1 John 4:16). It also contains the follow-
ing passage:
This we have said in the case where the things done are similar. In the case 
where they are diverse, we find a man by charity made fierce; and by iniq-
uity made winningly gentle. A father beats a boy, and a boy-stealer caresses. 
If thou name the two things, blows and caresses, who would not choose 
the caresses, and decline the blows? If thou mark the persons, it is charity 
that beats, iniquity that caresses. See what we are insisting upon; that the 
deeds of men are only discerned by the root of charity. For many things 
may be done that have a good appearance, and yet proceed not from the 
root of charity. For thorns also have flowers: some actions truly seem rough, 
seem savage; howbeit they are done for discipline at the bidding of charity. 
Once for all, then, a short precept is given thee: Love, and do what thou 
wilt: whether thou hold thy peace, through love hold thy peace; whether 
thou cry out, through love cry out; whether thou correct, through love cor-
rect; whether thou spare, through love do thou spare: let the root of love be 
within, of this root can nothing spring but what is good.3 
Thus, it is shepherd’s negligence if he does not take any actions when 
he sees that people persistently go wrong. As a shepherd he cannot just 
hope that a man will learn the truth himself and should not leave him on 
his own when he can act. It is better for the sake of wrongdoer’s salvation 
3 Augustin: Homily 7 on the First Epistle of John 8. Translated by H. Browne. 
In: Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 7. Edited by Ph. Schaff. Buffalo, 
NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1888. Revised and edited for New Advent by 
K. Knight. 
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to employ external coercion as long as it is in line with the law rather 
than fail to act.
Augustine could not accept religious freedom understood as pro-
grammed abstention from intervention by the state authority aimed at 
bringing people to the true Church, and thus enabling them to escape the 
clutches of wrongdoing as he perceived a man as a being whose free will 
has been thoroughly corrupted by original sin. The grace of God, which 
is the expression of God’s love can come from the outside, by application 
of law or even coercion. The duty of the bishop is to allow for the work 
of the grace of God.
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Augustine’s Argumentation against Religious Freedom
Summary
Augustine, the Bishop of Carthage participated in the Donatist conflict. In this dis-
pute he was an advocate of involvement of Roman authorities, including their military 
and police forces, on the Catholic side and against the Donatists. On the basis of this 
decision he more broadly justified his view that the state had a duty to actively promote 
the true faith, that is, Catholicism. He believed that bringing a man on the path of truth 
and thus protecting him from perdition in hell is a great good. In his opinion a man 
without such a support from the state could easily get lost and could not learn the truth. 
His view was based on two pillars. On the one hand, Augustine was convinced that the 
original sin destroyed the free will of a man to such extent that it was no longer capable 
of choosing the good, and on the other hand, he saw the law of the Empire, the Chris-
tian state, as an important path of God’s grace. Therefore, he believed that the adoption 
of the principle of religious freedom, that is, being neutral in religious issues by the state 
authorities would constitute a major betrayal of the duties of the authorities.
Jan Słomka
L’argumentation d’Augustin contre la liberté religieuse
Résumé
En tant qu’évêque de Carthage, Augustin a participé au litige donatiste. Dans le 
cadre de ce litige, il s’est déclaré pour l’engagement du pouvoir romain, y compris la force 
militaire et policière ; il s’est rangé sous la bannière catholique et non celle des donatistes. 
Pour ce qui est de sa décision, il a justifié son point de vue en constatant que le pouvoir 
étatique est obligé de soutenir activement la vraie foi, c’est-à-dire le catholicisme. Il trou-
vait que le fait de remettre l’homme sur la voie de la vérité et, par là, le protéger contre 
son anéantissement aux enfers est un grand bien. L’homme, dépourvu d’un tel soutien 
de la part de l’État, erre trop facilement et n’arrive pas à connaître la vérité. Son point de 
vue se fondait sur deux piliers. D’une part, Augustin était convaincu que le péché origi-
nel a si considérablement détruit le libre arbitre de l’homme que celui-là n’est point capa-
ble de choisir le bien de lui-même. D’autre part, il considérait la loi de l’Empire, étant un 
État chrétien, comme une voie importante de l’activité de la grâce divine. Cela étant, il 
pensait que le fait d’avoir adopter par les pouvoirs publics le principe de la liberté reli-
gieuse, à savoir la neutralité dans les questions liées à la religion, serait un manquement 
significatif aux devoirs de ce pouvoir.
Mots clés : Augustin, liberté religieuse, péché originel, pouvoir étatique, donatisme
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L’argomentazione di Agostino contro la libertà religiosa
Sommar io
Agostino in qualità di vescovo di Cartagine partecipò alla controversia donatista. 
Nell’ambito di tale controversia fu sostenitore dell’impegno dell’autorità romana, tra cui 
delle sue forze dell’esercito e della milizia, dalla parte cattolica contro i donatisti. Sul 
canovaccio di tale decisione motivò più ampiamente la sua opinione secondo la quale 
l’autorità dello stato ha il dovere di sostenere attivamente la fede autentica – il cattolice-
simo. Riteneva infatti che condurre l’uomo sul cammino della verità, e quindi proteggerlo 
dalla perdizione dell’inferno, fosse un grande bene. L’uomo, lasciato senza quest’aiuto da 
parte dello stato, erra troppo facilmente e non giunge a conoscere la verità. Questa sua 
opinione poggiava su due pilastri. Da un lato Agostino era convinto che il peccato origi-
nale danneggiò così fortemente il libero arbitrio dell’uomo che da solo non è capace di 
scegliere il bene; dall’altro, scorgeva la legge dell’Impero, dello stato cristiano, come un 
cammino importante di azione della grazia di Dio. Per tale motivo sosteneva che l’accet-
tazione da parte delle autorità dello stato del principio della libertà religiosa, e quindi 
della neutralità nelle questioni religiose, avrebbe rappresentato una sottrazione essenziale 
agli obblighi di tale autorità.
Parole chiave: Agostino, libertà religiosa, peccato originale, autorità dello stato, donatismo
